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W. Bradley Wendel
When I tell people that I am a law professor specializing 
in legal ethics, they usually have one of two reactions: 
“Legal ethics—that’s an oxymoron!” or “I bet you al-
ways have a lot to do.” The second reaction is the more 
interesting of the two, because it rightly implies that 
legal ethics is a fascinating fi eld, in part because lawyers 
are always thinking of new ways to get into trouble. 
The academic discipline of legal ethics got a substantial 
boost from the Watergate scandal, 
which led to the ABA’s mandate that 
all law students take a course in “the 
history, goals, structure, duties, val-
ues, and responsibilities of the legal 
profession and its members . . ..”1 
In academic terms, however, Water-
gate was fairly straightforward—the 
participants engaged in outright criminal wrongdoing. 
In the words of former White House counsel John 
Dean, “I knew the things I was doing were wrong, 
and one learns the difference between right and wrong 
before one enters law school.”2 In other words, the 
lawyers caught up in the Watergate scandal were sim-
ply crooks. And if the norms we call legal ethics were 
simply aimed at restraining crooks, the subject would 
not have much intellectual vitality independent of the 
subjects of criminal and regulatory law. In fact, many 
run-of-the-mill lawyer disciplinary cases involve simple 
wrongdoing, such as stealing from client funds, which 
does not present conceptually interesting issues.
 Contemporary high-profi le legal ethics scandals, 
by contrast, are made considerably more complicated 
by the attempt by lawyers, at least on a superfi cial 
level, to comply with the law. Think of any embar-
rassment to the legal profession from the 1980s or 
90s—the savings-and-loan crisis, the proliferation 
of abusive tax shelters, or the fi nancial accounting 
debacle at Enron—and in each case highly sophis-
ticated lawyers attempted to excuse their conduct 
by claiming to have complied with the law in the 
pursuit of their clients’ goals. After an executive in the 
fi nance department of Enron warned presciently that 
the company might “implode in a wave of account-
ing scandals,” the company hired one of its regular 
outside law fi rms to investigate the allegations. The 
fi rm reported back that lawyers and accountants had 
been “creative and aggressive” in seeking favorable 
accounting treatment for various transactions, but 
that they had done nothing legally wrong.3 Similarly, 
when the media fi rst reported that U.S. government 
lawyers had prepared memos advising the military and 
CIA on how to avoid criminal liability for engaging 
in the cruel and inhumane treatment of detainees,4 
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Lawyers are prohibited by state disciplinary rules from 
counseling or assisting a client’s unlawful conduct.
two law professors from the University of Chicago 
dismissed the criticism of their authors as the failure 
to appreciate that the government lawyers were sim-
ply giving legal advice. The memos 
were “standard fare, routine lawyerly 
stuff,” they argued.5
 The Enron collapse and the 
torture-memo controversy present 
one of the central challenges for le-
gal ethics—differentiating the act of 
aiding and abetting wrongdoing from transactional 
counseling and planning that avoids legal liability in a 
legitimate way. In the parlance of tax lawyers, the issue 
is how to locate the line between avoiding legal penal-
ties (acceptable) and evading the law (unacceptable). 
Lawyers sometimes forget that it is not a suffi cient 
defense to legal liability for a lawyer to point out that 
he or she was acting in a professional capacity, doing 
the sorts of things that lawyers do. It is well estab-
lished that a lawyer may be civilly or criminally liable 
for conduct that is in many respects indistinguishable 
from typical “lawyer work,” such as preparing opinion 
letters to be used in closing fi nancial transactions.6 As 
a matter of generally applicable criminal, tort, and 
regulatory law, if the lawyer knows facts from which 
a reasonable person would conclude that the client’s 
proposed course of action is criminal or fraudulent, 
the lawyer may have a duty to avoid assisting that 
conduct. In addition, lawyers are separately prohibited 
by state disciplinary rules from counseling or assisting 
a client’s unlawful conduct.7
 At this point some lawyers might object that it begs 
the question to analyze the lawyer’s liability in terms 
of whether the client’s proposed course of action is 
criminal or fraudulent. The law may be suffi ciently 
manipulable that a clever lawyer will be able in almost 
all cases to make a straight-faced argument that the 
client’s conduct was lawful. Or, the law may simply be 
understood in terms of what the client can get away 
with. This perspective is known in legal theory as the 
“Holmesian bad man” stance, after Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’ defi nition of the law as a prediction about how 
legal offi cials might decide particular cases, illustrated 
through the metaphor of a “bad man” who is interested 
only in avoiding legal penalties that might attach to his 
conduct.8 The trouble with the Holmesian bad man 
stance is that it drains all normativity from the law. 
The fact that something is a legal norm is not itself a 
reason to act; it is merely a datum that a lawyer will 
take into account in predicting whether an offi cial will 
sanction her client’s conduct. Perhaps some system of 
social control could work in this way, but it would 
not be recognizably a system of law.
 A statement about what the law requires is in-
herently a statement about a standard of behavior 
that others in a social group believe to be obligatory. 
This means that a lawyer engaged in the process of 
interpreting and applying the law must take into ac-
count the expectations of other lawyers and judges 
who are concerned with the meaning of the relevant 
legal norms. The expectations of these other partici-
pants are very likely not structured only around the 
variety of superfi cially plausible readings of the text 
of a statute or regulation that could be concocted by 
a clever lawyer. Rather, the community of interpreters 
also relies on considerations such as the overall sense 
of purpose or function that a given regime of rules 
possesses. If this all sounds obscure, it may be useful 
to consider the process of interpreting legal norms in 
the context of specifi c cases.9
Structured Finance 
Transactions at Enron
The transactions designed by Enron employees, along 
with outside accountants and lawyers, were mind-bog-
glingly complicated in their details, but fairly simple 
in theory. The idea was to move debt off the balance 
sheet of Enron and onto the books of an unrelated 
entity in order to prop up Enron’s credit rating and 
enable it to continue borrowing at low interest rates. 
There are a variety of legitimate ways to accomplish 
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this goal, but as Enron’s fi nancial condition deterio-
rated, it needed to continue hiding debt. It therefore 
put pressure on its lawyers and accountants to fi gure 
out novel ways to structure off-balance-sheet fi nancing 
transactions, even if they seemed to 
be pushing the boundaries of ac-
ceptability. Like any other reason-
ably complex regime of legal norms, 
the rules governing the accounting 
treatment of corporate transactions 
have an underlying sense and ra-
tionale, but the spirit or purpose 
of the rules is expressed by detailed 
textual provisions that are subject to manipulation. 
Eventually, the pressure by upper management to bend 
the rules to accommodate preferred transactions led 
to the kind of abuse that is colorfully illustrated by a 
former Enron employee:
Say you have a dog, but you need to create a 
duck on the fi nancial statements. Fortunately, 
there are specifi c accounting rules for what 
constitutes a duck: yellow feet, white covering, 
orange beak. So you take the dog and paint its 
feet yellow and its fur white and you paste an 
orange plastic beak on its nose, and then you 
say to your accountants, “This is a duck! Don’t 
you agree that it’s a duck?” And the accountants 
say, “Yes, according to the rules, this is a duck.” 
Everybody knows that it’s a dog, not a duck, 
but that doesn’t matter, because you’ve met the 
rules for calling it a duck.10
 The point of this illustration is that eventually, as a 
purported interpretation of law becomes too detached 
from the underlying rationality of the rules, it be-
comes, clearly, fl imfl am, and can be recognized as such 
by any competent observer. Everyone knows a dog is 
still a dog, even with the pasted-on beak. Similarly, a 
bogus off-balance-sheet fi nancing transaction can be 
characterized as abusive, despite superfi cial compli-
ance with the fi nancial accounting rules. A legitimate 
transaction of this nature involves a genuine transfer of 
ownership of an asset from the originating company 
(Enron) to a special-purpose entity. For there to be a 
“true sale” of an asset, the originating company may 
not retain any of the economic benefi ts of ownership 
of the asset, and a creditor of the special-purpose entity 
may not have any recourse against the originating 
company in the event of bankruptcy of the special-
purpose entity.11 Although it is possible to create 
elaborate transactions that simulate the transfer of 
ownership, a competent lawyer or judge can evaluate 
the transaction to determine whether ownership of the 
asset was actually transferred. In many of the Enron 
transactions, there were side-agreements or quirky 
options provisions that had the effect of permitting 
Enron to retain control over the asset. Moreover, the 
whole point of structured fi nance transactions using 
special-purpose entities is to reduce transaction costs 
by removing banks and other intermediaries from the 
fi nancing process. The numbing complexity of the 
Enron transactions—which were, naturally, costly for 
lawyers and accountants to create—suggests strongly 
that the off-balance-sheet deals were not reducing the 
costs of obtaining fi nancing, which would have been 
a legitimate use of structured fi nance, but were being 
used for some improper purpose.
 None of these reasons is suffi cient in itself as a 
basis for concluding that the Enron special-purpose 
entity transactions were a sham. But the reasoning 
process is important here, because it shows that the 
conclusion that some purported duck is really just a 
dog with a pasted-on beak is not merely a gut reaction. 
Distinguishing dogs from ducks is not just a matter 
of saying, as Justice Stewart famously remarked about 
pornography, “I know it when I see it.” Instead, it is 
the conclusion of an argument made on the basis of 
the structure and purpose of the legal and accounting 
Lawyers have an obligation to treat the law 
with respect, and not merely as an inconvenient 
obstacle to be planned around in furtherance of their 
clients’ ends. 
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rules in question—that is, a process of interpretation 
that is sensitive to the substance of rules and not only 
the words of a statute or regulation. Thus, we can con-
clude that the lawyers working on the special-purpose 
entity transactions for Enron failed to comply with the 
actual law, even while they pretended to comply with 
the apparent law. Note, too, that the argument here 
does not make reference to some amorphous standard 
like the public interest.
 Lawyers serve clients, not the public directly, al-
though in an important sense they respond to the 
needs of the public indirectly by serving as custodians 
of the law. As caretakers, lawyers have an obligation to 
treat the law with respect, and not merely as an incon-
venient obstacle to be planned around in furtherance 
of their clients’ ends. In the litigation context, a lawyer 
may be justifi ed in taking a relatively more aggres-
sive stance toward the law, for example, by making a 
non-frivolous argument that the client’s conduct was 
not unlawful. Transactional practice is not adversarial 
litigation, however, and lawyers should not assume that 
the obligation of “zealous advocacy within the bounds 
of the law” permits them to base legal conclusions they 
set out in opinion letters on positions they would be 
permitted to take in litigation. Thus, while a certain 
amount of creative and aggressive advocacy may be 
permissible in litigation, the Enron lawyers erred by 
assuming that pushing the edge of the envelope, so to 
speak, was acceptable in seeking to obtain favorable ac-
counting treatment for their client’s structured-fi nance 
transactions.
Legal Restrictions on Torture
The invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of the Sep-
tember 11th attacks resulted in the capture of numer-
ous detainees with possible al-Qaeda affi liation, who 
might have possessed information on the structure 
of the organization, personnel, or even future terror-
ist attacks. The Bush administration was therefore 
faced with an urgent question regarding the limits 
it should impose on interrogation techniques. Of-
fi cials in the Department of Defense and advisers to 
the president naturally turned to lawyers to interpret 
and apply the domestic and international legal norms 
governing the treatment of prisoners. The resulting 
memos, prepared by the Justice Department’s Offi ce 
of Legal Counsel, were leaked to the press and quickly 
dubbed the “torture memos.” The memos consider a 
wide range of legal issues, from whether the Geneva 
Convention protections afforded to prisoners of war 
extend to suspected Taliban or al-Qaeda detainees, to 
whether the President’s power as Commander in Chief 
could be limited by an act of Congress criminalizing 
mistreatment of prisoners. One of the most notorious 
memos concluded that certain methods of interroga-
tion might be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, yet fall 
outside the defi nition of prohibited acts of torture. 
Moreover, even if an act were deemed torture, the 
memo concluded that it might be justifi ed by self-
defense or necessity.
 Where the government lawyers’ arguments took a 
wrong turn was in adopting an artifi cially narrow per-
spective on the legal issues, focused only on particular 
legal texts divorced from their historical and policy 
contexts. Administration offi cials referred repeatedly 
to the novel nature of the confl ict with al-Qaeda, im-
plying that the law ought to be interpreted less rigor-
ously. This argument is blocked, however, by specifi c 
provisions in the international law against torture. The 
United Nations 1984 Convention Against Torture 
contains a non-derogation provision, which bluntly 
states that “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, 
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency, 
may be invoked as a justifi cation of torture.”12 The 
non-derogation language was included specifi cally to 
An employee carries a 
box from the offi ces of 
Enron in downtown 
Houston as the company 
teetered on the edge of 
bankruptcy in 2001. 
Enron’s bankruptcy 
remains the corporate 
world’s largest, with 
costs estimated at $780 
million.
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The critique is that the lawyers failed to live up to their 
obligation to respect the law. 
prevent states from attempting to 
defi ne a category of crimes so dan-
gerous to society that law enforce-
ment offi cials should be permitted 
extraordinary latitude.13 The enact-
ment history of the 1984 Convention shows that an 
argument from the unprecedented nature of the con-
fl ict with al-Qaeda is simply going to be a nonstarter. 
States frequently try to justify torture as a reasonable 
self-defense measure against an extraordinary threat, 
which is precisely why the non-derogation provision 
was included in the Convention.
 Not only did the government lawyers exclude 
moral, policy, and historical considerations from their 
analysis, but they ignored other clearly relevant legal 
texts, as well as traditional techniques for interpret-
ing texts. Consider, for example, the memorandum 
which concluded that an act constitutes torture un-
der a federal statute only if it causes severe physical 
or mental pain or suffering, with “severe” defi ned in 
terms of other federal statutes defi ning a medical emer-
gency for the purpose of establishing a right to health 
benefi ts.14 It is, to put it mildly, peculiar to make an 
argument drawing an analogy between “severe pain” 
for the purposes of a statute prohibiting torture and 
another statute defi ning a medical emergency as in-
volving a “serious dysfunction of any bodily organ 
or part.” The health benefi ts statute notes, almost in 
passing, that in an emergency the patient will exhibit 
symptoms including severe pain. This is not a defi ni-
tion of severe pain in terms of organ dysfunction. It is 
a defi nition of emergency in terms of organ dysfunction 
with possible accompanying severe pain. Surely they 
are better analogies for the criminal prohibition on 
torture than the statute authorizing health benefi ts 
for patients experiencing a medical emergency.
 This style of argument strongly suggests that the 
lawyers had a motive other than providing their client 
with an impartial and objective analysis of the law. 
There is nothing wrong with advising a client to take 
a novel or creative position under existing law, in the 
hope that a legal offi cial might treat the client’s posi-
tion favorably. If transactional lawyers were permit-
ted to give only the most conservative legal advice, a 
signifi cant avenue for legal change would be closed 
off. If a lawyer’s advice is creative and the client’s po-
sition is unlikely to prevail, however, the lawyer has 
an obligation to explain this clearly to the client, so 
that the client can decide whether to incur the risk 
of an unfavorable ruling.15 One of the striking things 
about the whole set of Justice Department memos 
is that they do not acknowledge how far out of the 
mainstream their position is with respect to executive 
power, the application of international legal norms, 
the construction of federal statutes, and other legal 
issues they address. Two of the defenders of the govern-
ment lawyers argue, in effect, that the position taken 
in the memos, particularly with respect to executive 
power, is so cutting-edge that it has wrongly been 
thought crazy rather than innovative.16 The trouble 
In a photograph from February, a U.S. Army doctor holds an external feeding tube 
that is being used to feed fi ve detainees that have been on a hunger strike for over 
sixty days. U.S. Army Brigadier General Jay W. Hood, Commander Joint Task 
Force Guantanamo, said that the United States could not stand by and let people 
commit “suicide” while in their care. Detainees are being fed through their noses 
via a polyurethane feeding tube.
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with this defense is that nowhere in the memos do the 
authors fl ag the argument as a challenge to received 
wisdom. Instead, it is presented without qualifi cation, 
almost blandly, as a factual report on what the law is, 
not what it might be if the innovative arguments of 
the authors were accepted.
Conclusion
In both the Enron and torture cases, the Holmesian 
bad man interpretive stance caused lawyers to give 
defi cient legal advice. The ethical critique of the law-
yers’ actions is not that structured-fi nance transactions 
are bad (they’re probably useful, on balance) or that 
torture is evil (it is, but government offi cials still need 
advice on what sorts of interrogation techniques short 
of torture are permissible). Instead, the critique is that 
the lawyers failed to live up to their obligation to re-
spect the law. There are situations in which lawyers 
are permitted, even required, to make creative and ag-
gressive arguments. Outside the context of adversarial 
litigation, or transactions in which the lawyer’s novel 
interpretation of the law is clearly disclosed to other 
parties and to regulators, lawyers share some of the 
responsibility ordinarily assigned to courts: that is, to 
ensure that the law is interpreted and applied sensibly, 
with due regard to its underlying purpose and rational-
ity. The lawyers in these cases were not crooks, in the 
sense of openly disregarding the law. The wrongdoing 
in the Enron and torture memos cases was much more 
subtle, involving superfi cial compliance with the law, 
but a fundamental disregard for the law as a legitimate 
source of constraint on the actions of clients. Teachers 
of legal ethics must therefore address the problem of 
excessive creativity and aggressiveness by lawyers who 
claim to be guided by the law, or we can expect more 
professional failures such as these.
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